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INTRODUCTION
A psychiatrist was asked "how many psychiatrists does it take to
change a light bulb?" He replied, "just one, but the light bulb has to
really want to change." Successful environmental pollution damages
litigation is not only about recovering for the damage caused by the
pollution, but also making the polluter want to change. Since most
damages litigation is unable to totally repair the damage done and is
at best substituting money for what is often an unquantifiable harm,
merely recovering money may not provide a sufficient incentive to
avoid future pollution. Even an injunction that prevents further
pollution does not repair past pollution. In addition, damages for
pollution and an injunction against future pollution are not always
effective as deterrents to future pollution activities and may merely
represent reasonable costs of doing business.
Nowhere is the dilemma created by the lack of an effective
deterrent to prevent future pollution more evident than in the area of
environmental nuisances. Businesses that cause pollution and, as
result, produce a nuisance to their neighbors are usually sued for the
nuisance they have caused. Recoverable damages are usually capped
at the total value of the adjacent land. Often that is a small price to
* Mr. Roisman is the managing partner of the National Legal Scholars Firm in
Lebanon, NH and a Research Fellow in Environmental Studies at Dartmouth
College. A draft of this article was included in the papers for the 35h Annual ALI-
ABA Environmental Litigation Course on June 16-18, 2010. The author believes
the principles cited are still good law but notes that the Restatement (Second) of
Torts is currently being revised by the ALL.
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pay for avoiding the purchase of expensive pollution control
equipment and is treated as the cost of doing business.
This article explores an alternative remedy which, where the nuisance
is accompanied by a trespass, can substantially alter the incentives to
avoid the pollution in the first place. Because trespass remedies
include removal of the trespass and because removal of a trespass
caused by pollution to groundwater or soil can be extremely
expensive, the viable threat of a mandatory injunction requiring clean
up of the pollution can serve as a powerful incentive to avoid
polluting in the first instance. The relevant legal principles are
discussed and the law of a number of states is explored to illustrate
the variations in the principles involved as they are applied in
individual cases.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
One is subject to liability to another for trespass,
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any
legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a
thing or a third person to do so, or
(b) remains on the land, or
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under
a duty to remove.
Causing entry of a thing. The actor, without himself
entering the land, may invade another's interest in its
exclusive possession by throwing, propelling, or placing a
thing either on or beneath the surface of the land or in the
air space above it. Thus, in the absence of the possessor's
consent or other privilege to do so, it is an actionable
trespass to throw rubbish on another's land, even though he
himself uses it as a dump heap, or to fire projectiles or to
fly an advertising kite or balloon through the air above it,
even though no harm is done to the land or to the
possessor's enjoyment of it. In order that there may be a
trespass under the rule stated in this Section, it is not
necessary that the foreign matter should be thrown directly
and immediately upon the other's land. It is enough that an
act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial
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certainty result in the entry of the foreign matter. Thus one
who so piles sand close to his boundary that by force of
gravity alone it slides down onto his neighbor's land, or
who so builds an embankment that during ordinary rainfalls
the dirt from it is washed upon adjacent lands, becomes a
trespasser on the other's land.'
Injunction is among the remedies available in the case of a
trespass.2 Whether an injunction is appropriate, for either a trespass
or a nuisance, depends upon a number of factors:
The appropriateness of the remedy of injunction against a
tort depends upon a comparative appraisal of all of the
factors in the case, including the following primary factors:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected,
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction
and of other remedies,
(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing
suit,
(d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff,
(e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if
an injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is denied,
(f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the
order or judgment.3
Although frequently treated as interchangeable, there are
significant differences between a claim for trespass and a claim for
nuisance:
Trespass distinguished. A trespass is an invasion of the
interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry
upon it. A nuisance is an interference with the interest in
the private use and enjoyment of the land, and does not
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 48 (1979).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936(1) (1979).
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require interference with the possession. A trespass was
remediable at common law by an action of trespass; the
private nuisance was remediable by an action on the case.
Trespass and private nuisance are alike in that each is a
field of tort liability rather than a single type of tortious
conduct. In each, liability may arise from an intentional or
an unintentional invasion. For an intentional trespass, there
is liability without harm; for a private nuisance, there is no
liability without significant harm. In trespass an intentional
invasion of the plaintiffs possession is of itself a tort, and
liability follows unless the defendant can show a privilege.
In private nuisance an intentional interference with the
plaintiffs use or enjoyment is not of itself a tort, and
unreasonableness of the interference is necessary for
liability.4
Among the important differences between trespass and nuisance is
the requirement that the nuisance must cause "significant harm"
before it is actionable,s and the harm caused by the nuisance must
outweigh the utility of the conduct which causes the harm.6 Since
neither of these are requirements for trespass, it is not only easier to
prove a trespass but the relief obtained may be less constrained by
having to engage in a precise balancing of the interests of the
trespasser against those of the plaintiff. For example, the plaintiff
will often obtain an injunction by showing that the property at issue is
uniquely important, such as the family residence.7
The legal preference for the rights of the person who has been
subjected to a trespass over the rights of someone who has suffered a
nuisance finds its roots in the common law difference between the
rights of property owners and the rights of others:
Personal interests and property interests. During the
nineteenth century the rule was generally declared that
equity intervened only to protect property interests, and so
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. d (1979) (internal cross-
reference omitted).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979).
7. Cf, Heninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 (1980).
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an injunction would not issue to prevent a violation of a
mere personal interest. In the early part of the current
century, however, this limitation on the scope of injunctive
relief was strongly repudiated by textwriters and
substantially undermined in the courts by the common
practice of finding tenuous "property interests" to justify
the issuance of injunctions in situations in which the real
purpose and result was to protect personal interests. In
recent decades, the trend toward express abandonment of
the property-right restriction has become stronger, and
courts have commonly held that injunctions are to be
granted to protect personal rights on the same basis as to
protect property rights.
As the note observes, the gap between personal interests and
property interests has been closing but in the area of pollution which
creates a trespass, and the same pollution which creates a nuisance,
the differences that remain, as noted above, are substantial. Not only
is a trespass automatically actionable and no actual harm is required
to be proven, but the law has generally approved relief from a
trespass in the form of a total removal of the trespass while a
nuisance need only be abated to the point where it no longer
represents an "interference with the use and enjoyment" of the
property. This latter concept is often used to defend a partial clean up
of pollution on land not owned by the polluter because, it is argued,
the remaining pollution does not create a substantial risk of personal
injury.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES APPLIED
The difference in the available remedy for nuisance and for
trespass is illustrated by the following example:
Big Chemical operates its plant adjacent to the home of
Nice Family. Every morning a "snack wagon" comes on
the property of Big Chemical to provide coffee and food to
the employees during their 10 a.m. break. The only place
on the property where this can occur is immediately
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 937 cmt. a (1979).
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adjacent to the property of Nice Family. This creates a
certain amount of noise from the people who gather at the
"snack wagon" during their 30 minute break. In addition,
wrappers and other trash from the food and drink are
routinely dropped on the ground and blow on to the
property of Nice Family. Nice Family wants to enjoin the
coffee break to stop the noise and the trash from coming on
their property and to force removal of the trash on their
property.
A suit in nuisance will not fully succeed because on
balance the benefits to the employees of Big Chemical
outweighs the inconvenience to Nice Family and the noise
caused by the coffee break is not unreasonable. The
diminution of Nice Family's property value due to the trash
will cap their damages if it is too expensive to remove all
the trash. An injunction against further trash blowing on to
their property will be granted.
However, a suit to require Big Chemical to remove all of
the coffee break trash from Nice Family's property and
prevent any further trash from coming on their property
will certainly succeed. Big Chemical will not be allowed to
leave some of the trash on Nice Family's property on the
theory that a little trash is really not that annoying or that a
little trash does not create any substantial risk of injury to
the family.
Similarly, if the trespass were caused by chemical wastes
entering Nice Family's property, such as lead or cadmium,
Big Chemical could be required, under the law of trespass,
to remove all of the lead and cadmium, not merely to
remove it to the point where the risk of injury from
exposure was below some "health-based" clean up standard
established by EPA under federal pollution laws.9 As noted
9. A separate issue, not explored here, is the difference between a permanent
and a temporary trespass. The difference between temporary and permanent
damages is "whether the act producing the injury is productive of all of the damage
which can result from the injury, and no further damage can ensue, or whether the
injury is intermittent and occasional, or the cause thereof capable of being
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above, there are still several tests that must be met to obtain
the injunction requiring a total clean up, but those tests are
more easily met where the underlying cause of action is
trespass, rather than nuisance.
Several legal principles have emerged from the cases holding that
the appropriate remedy for a trespass is removal of the trespass:10
1. Some courts focus on the long-standing recognition of the
absolute rights which the owner of land possesses, which
rights cannot be compromised by a neighbor's trespass:
It is the general rule in this Commonwealth that the
owner of land is entitled to a mandatory injunction to
require the removal of buildings and structures that
have been unlawfully placed upon his land, and the
remedied, removed or abated. In the former case the damages are permanent and in
the latter case the damages are temporary." Riddle v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 73
S.E.2d 793, 803 (W.Va. 1952).
That distinction can be extremely important both for statute of limitations
purposes and for the measure of damages. If the trespass is permanent, an
injunction requiring removal is impossible. Only a temporary trespass, i.e. one that
can be removed, would qualify for a total removal remedy. See Cook v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Colo. 2004), for a thorough discussion of
these issues. That decision, relying on Colorado law and general common law
principles, finds that a trespass cannot be deemed "permanent" unless two
conditions are met: "I hold the alleged presence of plutonium from Rocky Flats on
plaintiffs' and class members' properties constitutes a continuing tort under
Colorado law because, like the contamination at issue in Hoery, it allegedly
remains on the property and, even if it will remain there indefinitely, is not a
permanent tort because it does not serve a socially beneficial purpose." Id. at 1013
(citing Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 223 (Colo. 2003) ('continued
contamination does not benefit the development of our state' and 'no sound public
policy support[s] the classification of contamination from the release of toxic
chemicals as a permanent property invasion.')). Implicitly the court finds that any
pollution left on the property is contrary to the public interest and thus, it can be
argued, the balancing test applicable to injunctive relief favors the party seeking a
full clean up of their property so long as clean up is possible.
10. The reasoning discussed here applies to one landowner's claim against
another landowner. It may not apply where the claim is by a subsequent landowner
against a prior landowner to remove all pollution from the land. Cf Kennedy
Building Assocs. v. Viacom, 375 F.3d 731, 741-42 (8th Cir. 2004).
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fact that the plaintiff has suffered little or no damage
on account of the offending buildings or structures, or
that the wrongdoer was acting in good faith, or that the
cost of removing the building or structure will be
greatly disproportionate to the benefit to the plaintiff
resulting from their removal is ordinarily no bar to the
granting of injunctive relief . . . A continuing trespass
wrongfully interferes with the legal rights of the
owner, and in the usual case those rights cannot be
adequately protected except by an injunction which
will eliminate the trespass."
2. Other courts focus on the consequences that would follow if
the remedy to which a plaintiff would be entitled is limited to
the full value of the property. If the remedy were so limited,
then the innocent party would not be restored to the position
they held before the trespass and would be forced to accept
changes to the property or pay for additional restoration out of
their own pocket. "First, recovery of tort damages is not
invariably limited by the value of damaged property. The
courts have recognized that recovery in excess of such value
may be necessary to restore the plaintiff to the position it
occupied prior to a defendant's wrongdoing."' 2
3. Some courts have focused on the continuing nature of the
trespass which cannot be remedied until the trespass is
removed. Any remedy that does not require removal of the
trespass essentially sanctions the trespass.
11. Sheppard Envelope Co. v. Arcade Malleable Iron Co., 138 N.E.2d 777, 782-
83 (Mass. 1956) (internal citations omitted).
12. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1273 (Cal. 1990) (citing
Heninger, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 107 (permitting recovery of reasonable repair costs in
excess of value of damaged property, when plaintiff has personal reason for making
repairs); Dandoy v. Oswald Bros. Paving Co., 298 P. 1030, 1031 (1931) ("To hold
that appellant is without a remedy merely because the value of land has not been
diminished, would be to decide that by wrongful act of another, an owner of land
may be compelled to accept a change in the physical condition of his property, or
else perform the work of restoration at his own expense. This would be a denial of
the principle that there is no wrong without a remedy."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 929 (1979)).
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Plaintiffs have asserted that defendants' acts constitute
a continuing trespass and have created a nuisance.
The trespass, according to the plaintiffs, results from
the placement of contaminated fill on their property in
violation of a license allowing the deposit of clean fill,
continues as long as the fill remains on the property,
and may not be remedied except through a mandatory
injunction requiring defendants to remove the fill. As
discussed below, our courts have held that a
continuing trespass may justify an award of equitable
relief in the form of a mandatory injunction.13
In Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., the Illinois Supreme
Court ordered an entire toxic waste site, deemed adequately safe by
the EPA, although some residual risk remained, be exhumed and
moved to a new location. 14 It adopted the following language of Fink
v. Board of Trustees:
While, as a general proposition, an injunction will be
granted only to restrain an actual, existing nuisance, a court
of equity may enjoin a threatened or anticipated nuisance,
where it clearly appears that a nuisance will necessarily
result from the contemplated act or thing which it is sought
to enjoin. This is particularly true where the proof shows
that the apprehension of material injury is well grounded
upon a state of facts from which it appears that the danger
is real and immediate. While care should be used in
granting injunctions to avoid prospective injuries, there is
no requirement that the court must wait until the injury
occurs before granting relief'.
This was a nuisance case where the court acknowledged that
balancing was required but still believed the risks to the community
were too great to allow the nuisance to continue.
13. Gordon v. Nat'1 Rail Passenger Corp., 1997 WL 298320 (Del. Ch.) at *7.
14. 426 N.E.2d 824, 836 (Ill. 1981).
15. Id. (citing Fink v. Board of Trustees, 218 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Ill. 1966)).
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An important caveat is that courts have not been uniformly
amenable to the trespass/nuisance distinction and may, if the facts are
not compelling, deny relief either by denying there is a trespass (not a
sufficiently substantial invasion to qualify) or engaging in the kind of
balancing of interests that occur under nuisance law. To avoid this
pitfall it is essential to (1) rely on historical precedents in the
common law as well as the Restatement, and (2) make policy
arguments about the right of the landowner to be free from the wastes
of its neighbors and how allowing the trespass to continue is
essentially sanctioning a private condemnation. A mere glancing
reference to some trespass law will not be enough to make the case
sufficiently persuasive, particularly where the opposition will be
considerable.
Another problem that can arise with an injunction remedy for
trespass is the possible conflict with an EPA ordered clean up.16
However, even in that case the court recognized that for preemption
to apply there must be a clear conflict between the injunction sought
for total clean up, and the order of partial clean up from the EPA such
that compliance with both is not possible albeit the court's
application of the doctrine to the case appeared to ignore the
requirement.17  Significantly, under RCRA and CERCLA, both of
which are applying common law doctrines of liability for clean up,
there is no defense that the cost of clean up exceeds the value of the
land to be cleaned.
Despite these principles, there are some courts, discussed below,
that have been reluctant to allow an injured party to require a removal
that costs more than the value of the property upon which the trespass
has occurred. In such a case the court is in effect endorsing the
taking of property owned by one private party for the use as a waste
storage facility by another private power. Such a concept seems
inherently indefensible. Even the government cannot take property
by condemnation solely for the benefit of another private party.18
Thus, merely compensating the plaintiff for the continued presence
on her property of pollution that emanated from defendant, should
16. See, e.g., Cavallo v. Texaco, 100 F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 1155.
18. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) ("it has long
been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole




not be allowed and a mandatory injunction should be available to
compel defendant to remove the pollution from plaintiff s property.
The concept of trespass is not new to toxic tort litigation and appears
in most claims. However, it is the unique trespass remedies that may
significantly alter the outcome of such litigation. Perhaps no
defendant will ever spend $250,000 to totally remove all of its
pollution from a $20,000 residence, but it is unlikely the plaintiff in
such a case will have to settle for a "market value" buyout and some
moving expenses as compensation for property damage.
III. STATES ALLOWING INJUNCTION TO REMOVE TRESPASS
Several states have adopted, in one form or another, the concept
that a trespass remedy of removal of the trespass can apply even if
the cost of removal substantially exceeds the value of the property
and even if the property owner has not suffered any substantial
quantifiable damages. Importantly, the courts give much greater
weight to this line of reasoning when the property involved has some
special significance to the plaintiff such as being the plaintiffs
residence or having some historical importance to the plaintiff. If the
land upon which the trespass is occurring is commercial land or
private land being rented to third parties, the courts are less likely to
order a remedy that substantially exceeds the value of the property.
The following cases illustrate, in particular fact situations, how the
courts have applied these concepts.
A. Alaska
Alaskan courts rely heavily on the Restatement of Torts, §929(a)
and American Jurisprudence on Damages to determine the amount of
damages to award or the necessity of a mandatory injunction. To
find the amount of restoration damages, the court allows a plaintiff
who has been injured by an invasion of his land to "elect as damages
either the loss in value or the cost of restoration which has been or
may be reasonably incurred." 19  In its determination, the court
follows that "[a]s a general rule, only where damages are temporary
is restoration an appropriate measure." 20 The granting of restoration
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §929 (1979).
20. See G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379,
1386 (Alaska 1974). Plaintiff owned a greenhouse on a river. Id. at 1381.
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costs further requires that the plaintiff have no adequate remedy at
21law. In cases of permanent damages, the court adheres to 22
Am.Jur.2d, Damages, which holds:
In case of an injury of a permanent nature to real property,
the proper measure of damages is the diminution in the
market value of the property by reason of that injury, or in
other words, the difference between the value of the land
before the injury and its value after the injury.22
When considering an injunction, the court adheres to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts §941, which holds: "[t]he relative
hardship likely to result to the defendant if an injunction is granted
and to the plaintiff if it is denied, is one of the factors to be
considered in determining the appropriateness of injunction against
tort." 23
The court will also consider the particular facts of each case,
including "the defendant's state of mind and the relative hardship to
the parties if removal is compelled or refused." 2 4 In this regard, the
burden is on the defendant to prove that it "acted in good faith
Defendant diverted the river, resulting in the deposit of silt along the land of
plaintiff. Id. During the diversion project, there were numerous trespasses onto
plaintiffs land by earthmoving equipment that caused extensive damage to trees
and ground cover. Id. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction
against further pollution, a mandatory injunction requiring correction of past silt
pollution, and damages for the destruction of ground vegetation and trees, and for
business interruptions and future clean up operations. Id at 1382. Plaintiff had
paid $4,000 per acre for his land, and was awarded $12,550 for restoring the 10,560
square feet that had been damaged, equating to $50,000 per acre. Id at 1387. The
award was upheld because defendant failed to show the award was clearly
erroneous. Id.
21. G & A Contractors, 517 P.2d at 1385.
22. Id. at 1386 n.9 (citing 22 AM.JuR.2D §§134, 135 (1965)).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §941 (1979).
24. Ostrem v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 648 P.2d 986, 989 (Alaska 1982).
Plaintiff sold an easement across his property to defendant, providing that all
electrical and communications lines were underground. Id. at 988. Defendant built
a valve control facility above ground in violation of the easement. Id. Plaintiff
sought injunctive relief but was only granted damages. Id. The Supreme Court of
Alaska remanded the case because the lower court failed to consider the state of
mind of defendant in its decision to deny injunctive relief Id. at 989.
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and. . . the cost or practicability of removing the [trespass] is wholly
out of proportion to the extent of the trespass." 2 5 In the event that a
defendant cannot prove these elements, the court will be willing to
grant injunctive relief.
B. Arkansas
Arkansas has a firm public policy in favor of remediation and
26
restoration. The State has established the Arkansas Department of
Environmental Quality that oversees air, water, solid waste,
hazardous waste, storage tanks, and mining regulatory programs
within the state.27 The ADEQ also manages several trust funds that
are used to help repay remediation costs depending on the type of
pollution.28
The Supreme Court of Arkansas allows for the consideration of the
personal value of a property, not just the monetary value to society at
large. Arkansas courts recognize that limiting recovery to the value
of the property cannot be the sole guideline because the value of a
property can differ depending on the use of the land, the aesthetics, or
the personal value the land holds for the landowner. Arkansas allows
a court to use its discretion in determining damages differently
depending on the specifics of the case, and has considered both a
"cost of replacement" rule and a "difference in value of the land"
25. Id. at 989.
26. See Felton Oil Co., L.L.C. v. Gee, 182 S.W.3d 72, 80 (Ark. 2004). The oil
company that owned a Conoco station that had been leaking diesel fuel into
neighboring property was required to remediate the land pursuant to Arkansas'
public policy. See id. at 74. Plaintiffs argued that the land had personal use for
them: they lived there and frequently had visitors. Id at 80. As a result of the leak,
the land's value decreased $20,500 from $31,500 to $11,000, but the jury awarded
restoration costs of $180,000. Id. The court held that "[they could not] say these
damages, which were approximately nine times the diminished fair market value,
were "grossly" disproportionate... [b]ecause of the property's personal nature." Id
27. ADEQ - Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality,
http://www.adeq.state.ar.us/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
28. Curiously, while the state is firm on requiring remediation, the state fights to
limit the amount of recovery for remediation to the diminution in value of the
property to be cleaned when the claim is against the state trust fund. When
personal value arguments are presented, the state finds itself on the losing side of
the battle.
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rule.29  That court also found, in dicta that the determination of
damages or the likelihood of injunctive relief is not necessarily
limited to the difference in fair market value of the land immediately
before and immediately after the occurrence 30 and may consider
"replacement value, cost of future treatment, aesthetic value, or
benefit" 3 1 of a damaged portion of property.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas holds in instances of pollution in
particular that damages should be measured by "the reasonable
expense of necessary repairs to any property which was damaged."32
Specifically for temporary damages to real property, the court holds
that "the measure of damages is the cost of restoring the property to
the same condition that it was in prior to the injury." 3 It is important
to note that this condition must conform to the landowner's
perception of the condition, and should include the personal value
attached. Arkansas courts have cited to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts §929, which comments:
29. See Worthington v. Roberts, 803 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Ark. 1991). In
Worthington, a property owner brought action against a crop duster who
negligently sprayed some ornamental fruit trees that subsequently died. Id. at 907-
08. The landowners testified that they had purchased the land specifically because
of the trees. Id. at 907. The court affirmed the award of reasonable restoration
costs. Id at 910.
30. Worthington, 803 S.W.2d at 910.
31. Id. at 909.
32. See Ark. Model Instruction §2224 (2009).
33. See State v. Diamond Lakes Oil Co., 66 S.W.3d 613, 618 (Ark. 2002). In
this case, a landowner sued a gas station for trespass by gasoline contamination on
her property. Id. at 613. This case is unique in that it encounters overlapping
regulation from the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund that affords
reimbursement costs for state government mandated site cleanup. See id at 615.
Defendant was required to clean up a Citgo gas station site at a cost exceeding
$260,000 despite the land being appraised at $52,400. See id at 618-19. When
applying for reimbursement from the fund, the Arkansas Department of
Environmental Quality refused defendant's request because the clean up was much
more expensive than the market value of the property. Id. at 615-16. Defendant
was awarded $200,000 in damages and the court cited that "ADEQ's evidence
about the fair market value of the property was irrelevant to what it would cost to
restore the property to its former condition", an ironic outcome considering that
ADEQ ordered the remediation in the first place only to have to pay significantly
more than the value of the land itself in reimbursement costs. Id. at 618.
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If... the cost of replacing the land in its original condition
is disproportionate to the diminution in the value of the
land caused by the trespass, unless there is a reason
personal to the owner for restoring the original condition,
damages are measured only by the difference between the
value of the land before and after the harm.... On the
other hand, if a building such as a homestead is used for a
purpose personal to the owner, the damages ordinarily
include an amount for repairs, even though this might be
greater than the entire value of the building.34
The court has supported this testament to the point of issuing
restoration costs amounting to nine times the fair market value.35 It is
clear that for maximum recovery and hope for mandatory injunction
in Arkansas, it is important to establish that repayment of the fair
market value of a property will not make the landowner whole.
Personal use including family enjoyment, sentimental value, and
visually pleasing elements can all help establish the "true" value of a
property.
C. California
California courts hold that an individual landowner's right to
absolute control over his property should reign supreme over
subsequent hardship that may result from requiring a trespassor to
remove a trespass. When deciding whether to rule in favor of a
plaintiff requesting an injunction, the courts universally rely on
comment "b" of §941 of the Restatement of Torts, which points out
that in such cases, "the defendant is the wrongdoer and it is his
actions that have caused the situation. This is a factor that should be
weighed against him."36 California also recognizes that the trier of
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §929 (1979) (emphasis added).
35. See Gee, 182 S.W.3d 72 (Ark. 2004).
36. See Christensen v. Tucker, 250 P.2d 660, 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
Plaintiff and defendants owned adjoining parcels of land. Id. at 660. Defendants
constructed a cement wall along what they thought was the boundary line, but
actually encroached on plaintiffs land for a total of 229 square feet. Id. at 661.
Plaintiff brought action for a mandatory injunction to compel removal of the
encroachments, damages for their maintenance, and damages for diversion of water
onto plaintiffs land caused by encroachments. Id. at 660-61. The circuit court held
that the encroached upon land had little value and that costs of removal would far
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fact has discretion in deciding to deny or grant a mandatory
injunction and can follow a balancing test to come to a decision. 3 7
This balancing test:
Starts with the premise that defendant is a wrongdoer, and
that plaintiffs property has been occupied. Thus, doubtful
cases should be decided in favor of the plaintiff. In order to
deny injunction, certain factors must be present: 1.
Defendant must be innocent - the encroachment must not
be the result of defendant's willful act, and perhaps not the
result of defendant's negligence. In this same connection
the court should weigh plaintiff's conduct to ascertain if he
is in any way responsible for the situation. 2. If plaintiff
will suffer irreparable injury by the encroachment, the
injunction should be granted regardless of the injury to
defendant, except, perhaps, where the rights of the public
will be adversely affected. 3. The hardship to defendant by
the granting of the injunction must be greatly
disproportionate to the hardship caused plaintiff by the
continuance of the encroachment and this fact must clearly
appear in the evidence and must be proved by the
defendant.38
There is a heavy burden on the defendant to prove that granting an
injunction would result in an extremely disproportionate result. It is
also the defendant's burden to prove that its actions resulting in the
trespass were neither willful nor negligent. 39 California courts extend
this doctrine to the extent that negligence can bar a defendant from
exceed the value of the land and denied the request for mandatory injunction. Id. at
662-63. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not consider the potential
for negligence on the part of defendants nor any possible contributory conduct on
the part of plaintiff. Id. at 666. It further noted that the defendant did not have the
boundary surveyed, and plaintiff had knowledge of the wall because it was built
before plaintiff purchased the land. Id. The district court's holding was reversed
for not being supported by the findings and a retrial was ordered on all issues in
accordance with the balancing test established in this opinion. Id. at 667.
37. Id. at 665.
38. Id.
39. This shifts the typical pattern of the burden of proof, which usually requires
that a plaintiff prove willful or negligent actions by a defendant.
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invoking the balancing doctrine as a defense to the application for a
mandatory injunction, stating "[i]t would appear that if a defendant is
negligent, and such negligence is the sole proximate cause of the
encroachment, such defendant should be barred from invoking the
doctrine." 40
If the court does exercise its discretion through the balancing
doctrine, it still will not limit damages or the granting of an
injunction to the diminution in market value of the property.41 The
California courts recognize the exceptions present in §929 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts that allow for the consideration of
personal value of a property and note that the "overall principles by
which the courts are to be guided are 'flexibility of approach and full
compensation to the owner, within the overall limitation of
reasonableness."' 42  This reasonableness standard leaves the court
broad discretion to consider all angles. Presumably, if a property has
a substantial level of personal value to a property owner, the court is
willing to order a mandatory injunction for the removal of a trespass.
It is the court's responsibility to ensure that it fully considers the
value of the property to the landowner, and if the landowner "ha[s]
personal reasons for restoring their land to its original condition, and
that such a restoration could be achieved at a cost that was not
40. Christensen, 250 P.2d at 666.
41. See generally Henninger v. Dunn, 162 Cal. Rptr. 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
In Henninger, defendants bulldozed a road onto adjoining land owned by plaintiff.
Id. at 104. The bulldozing killed or damaged 225 trees and destroyed much
vegetative growth. Id Plaintiffs sued even though the new road actually increased
the market value of plaintiffs' property by $5000. See id The trial court granted
injunctive relief but denied damages because there was no depreciation of value of
plaintiffs' property. Id. The court of appeals reversed on the grounds that
plaintiffs' had personal reasons for wanting to restore the property and that such
restoration could be done at a cost that was not unreasonable in relation to the
damage inflicted and the value of the land prior to the trespass. Id. The Henninger
case has further discussion of California Civil Code §3333 (1872) and §3346
(1957), which allow for double and treble damages that result from a willful or
malicious trespass resulting in wrongful injury to timber, trees, or underwood. Id. at
110-11. This could be significant if the injunction requested and subsequent
remediation costs do not greatly exceed the value of the property. When choosing
between treble or double damages or an injunction that costs only slightly more
than the value of the property in question, a trespassor would likely prefer the
injunction.
42. Id. at 108 (citing Huber v. Serpico, 176 A.2d 805, 813 (N.J.Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1962)).
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unreasonable in relation to the damage inflicted and the value of the
land prior to the trespass, the court should [exercise] its discretion to
award such restoration costs.A 3
While the court's discretion and balancing test may limit a
plaintiff s chances of being granted an injunction when the cost of the
injunction would greatly outweigh the value of the property,
California courts are willing to consider doing so in certain instances.
Notably, "[i]f plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury by the
encroachment, the injunction should be granted regardless of the
injury to defendant."44 California's standard is broad and puts
substantial burden on the defendant at the outset of the case.
D. Louisiana
Louisiana courts are reluctant to issue injunctions and have not
minced words when discussing the issuance of injunctions, holding
"[t]raditionally, injunction has been held to be a harsh, drastic, and
extraordinary remedy which should only issue where the petitioner is
threatened with irreparable harm and has no adequate remedy at
law."4 5  In certain instances, however, the court favors injunctive
relief, pursuant to paragraph 5, article 298 of the Louisiana Code of
Practice, which provides that:
[T]he injunction must be granted, and directed against the
defendant ... [w]hen the defendant disturbs the plaintiff in
the actual and real possession which such plaintiff has had
43. Id. at 109.
44. Posey v. Leavitt, 280 Cal. Rptr. 568, 575 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Plaintiff, owner of a condominium, brought action against another condominium
owner for the removal of a deck extension that encroached the common area and
obstructed plaintiff's view of the ocean, and for damages. Id. at 570. The trial court
entered judgment in favor of defendants. Id at 572. The court of appeals reversed,
holding the Christensen test was not followed. Id. at 578. The case was remanded
for the trial court to reconsider the injunction with the proper test. Id.
45. Kruger v. Garden Dist. Ass'n, 779 So. 2d 986, 991 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
Plaintiffs, property owners in the Garden District, filed for injunctive relief against
a special tax levied by the district association claiming it was unconstitutional. Id
at 988. The civil district court granted a preliminary injunction and declared the tax
unconstitutional. Id. The court of appeals held plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient
violation of a constitutional right or show irreparable injury and vacated the district
court holding. Id. at 993.
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for more than one year, either of a real estate or of a real
right, of which he claims either the ownership, the
possession or the enjoyment.46
When seeking injunctive relief, it is essential for the plaintiff to prove
that money damages would not adequately compensate him for
damage done by a trespass on his property.47 Upon a showing of
irreparable injury, a plaintiff will be entitled to injunctive relief.
"However, there is a narrow exception for the issuance of injunctive
relief, absent irreparable injury, when a prohibitory statute is
violated.A8
Louisiana gives the courts broad discretion in determining the test
of its choice for property disputes. Depending on the facts of the
case, the courts can consider both replacement costs and the
diminution in fair market value tests, and have gone so far as to deem
both of these tests inappropriate, stating that "[t]he court must adopt
an approach in each case that will do substantial justice between the
parties." 49
46. See Churchill Farms v. Gaudet, 168 So. 123, 124 (La. 1936). Plaintiff
owned 6,000 acres of land on which he hunted fur-bearing animals. Id. at 123.
Defendants trespassed upon the property and deprived plaintiff of full enjoyment
by trapping animals themselves and selling the pelts. Id. Plaintiff successfully
showed that his deprivation of the profits derived from his ownership of the land
would amount to an irreparable injury. Id. at 124. The court held that plaintiff was
entitled to protect his possession by injunction to keep defendants off the property.
Id.
47. See Brinker v. Junction City Wood Co., 744 So. 2d 657 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
Plaintiffs sued to enjoin timber cutting on a property in which they owned an
undivided interest. Id. at 659. On appeal, "the court noted that money damages
would not adequately compensate a man who planned to use the trees for timber to
repair his buildings in years to come and to supply his annual needs for wood or
who prized the trees for their ornamental and sentimental values." Id. at 662. The
trial court held the damages to be incalculable and issued a permanent injunction.
Id. at 660. The court of appeals held that plaintiff had not shown irreparable injury
and vacated the trial court order. Id. at 662. Upon rehearing, the court of appeals
held there is an exception for violations of prohibitory statutes, such as here, where
defendant violated LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:4278.2 (2003). Id at 663. Due to
defendant's failure to comply with the statute, the trial court was within its
discretion to grant a permanent injunction. Id.
48. Id. at 663.
49. See Turner v. S. Excavation, Inc., 322 So. 2d 326, 330. (La. Ct. App. 1975)
(citing Loeblich v. Gamier, 113 So. 2d 95 (La. Ct. App. 1959). A landowner
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To ensure that a plaintiff obtains the maximum desired relief, it is
imperative that he offers evidence of intangible value of a property.
The more irreplaceable value a piece of property holds, the more
likely the court will be willing to grant injunctive relief.
E. Massachusetts
Massachusetts protects the rights of a landowner more broadly than
any state that has been discussed thus far. Regardless of the value of
the property in question, the cost of removal of a trespass, or the
hardship placed on the defendant in removing the trespass:
[I]t is the general rule ... that the owner of land is entitled
to a mandatory injunction to require the removal of [a
trespass] that [has] been unlawfully placed upon his land,
and the fact that the plaintiff has suffered little or no
damage on account of the offending [trespass], or that the
wrongdoer was acting in good faith, or that the cost of
removing the [trespass] will be greatly disproportionate to
the benefit to the plaintiff resulting from their removal is
ordinarily no bar to the granting of injunctive relief 50
brought action against an excavation company that bulldozed a lot, destroying fruit
trees that had been planted by plaintiffs deceased husband and held sentimental
and aesthetic value. Id. at 327-28. Plaintiffs were awarded $5,000 as damages for
injury to the property, mental anguish, inconvenience, and invasion of and
deprivation of plaintiff s rights of private ownership and enjoyment of property. Id.
at 327. On appeal defendants argued that the diminution in market value would be
the proper measurement. Id. at 328. The court of appeals acknowledged that
sentimental value is usually not quantifiable but must be considered in a judgment
and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award. Id. at 330.
50. Ferrone v. Rossi, 42 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Mass. 1942). Defendant built an
awning over plaintiffs property line by two inches in the northern direction, four
feet nine inches in the eastern direction, and nine inches in the southern direction of
the structure. Id. at 565. The structure itself does not extend over the property line.
Id. Defendant acted in good faith during construction and the land built over had
little to no value for cultivation or other uses. Id. at 566. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk noted that "[t]he location of the existing wall
could not be changed without destroying it, and the cost of relocation would be
entirely out of proportion to the benefit if any, that would accrue to the plaintiff."
Id. Plaintiff was entitled to its removal within a time to be fixed by the superior
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Massachusetts courts further hold that "[a] continuing trespass
wrongfully interferes with the legal rights of the owner, and in the
usual case those rights cannot be adequately protected except by an
injunction which will eliminate the trespass." 5'
Massachusetts law also allows for a removal of a trespass even if
52there is no harm resulting from a trespass. In cases where a trespass
increases the value of a property, the landowner still has the absolute
right for that trespass's removal to have the land returned to its
original condition if it was so desired.5 In these cases, the court will
weigh possible damages for the cost of restoration versus equitable
relief and will choose that which is least expensive for the defendant.
This allows the defendant to attempt removal of a trespass, which
may be possible for less than the cost estimated by the court.
F. Michigan
Michigan relies on the judgment of the court to determine the best
way to fully compensate a plaintiff. 54 The court's analysis begins by
determining the "difference between the value of the freehold before
the damage and the value of the freehold after the damage."ss
However, this valuation must include intangible value that the land
has to the landowner. While the courts of Michigan recognize that
court despite the land having little value and the expense of removal being
disproportionate to the benefit to be gained. Id. at 567-68.
51. Id. at 566.
52. See Blood v. Cohen, 113 N.E.2d 448 (Mass. 1953). Plaintiff owned land
that bordered defendant's property on two sides. Id. at 449. One of plaintiffs lots
had no value except to abutting owners and was of no practical use to the owner of
the other half of the property. See id. Defendant built an outdoor fireplace and a
cement platform on an area of land worth $30. Id. The cost of restoring the land
would have cost around $1,750. Id. The construction actually increased the value
of plaintiffs property. Id. Plaintiff was granted a mandatory injunction for the
removal of the fireplace, platform, and steps to restore the property to its original
condition. Id.
53. Id. at 449.
54. See Thiele v. Detroit Edison Co., 458 N.W.2d 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
Landowner brought a trespass action alleging that defendant cut down eight trees
on landowner's property. Id. at 656. "The Court of Appeals held that the loss of
aesthetic value, the actual monetary value of the trees lost, and the cost of their
replacement constituted evidence of the diminution in the value of the freehold
estate." Id at 656. The case was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 657.
55. Id. at 657.
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"there is no one fixed, inflexible rule for determining damages in
cases. . .the courts should apply whatever approach is most
appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for the losses incurred based
on the facts of the individual case." 56  Thus, in cases where the
plaintiff holds a certain part of a property to have added value, such
as ornamental trees, the court takes that evidence into consideration.
The court further requires that "it is appropriate to consider the value
of the [unique feature] to the contemplated or existing uses of the
land, including the cost of replacement or restoration ... [w]here ...
the property destroyed has a unique value of its own."5 8 However, in
doing so the measure of damages must not exceed the value of the
property before the injury. 59 Ultimately, the court has final say, and
fully and properly compensating a victim of trespass is paramount.
While Michigan does not go as far as Massachusetts in protecting
the rights of the property owner, by requiring that all the intangible
value of the land be included in determining whether the cost of
removal exceeds the value of the property, Michigan does
substantially improve the rights of the victims of a trespass over the
normal nuisance case where the valuation of the land is limited to the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Schankin v. Buskirk, 93 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Mich. 1958). Defendant cut
down six large trees on plaintiffs lots. Id. at 295. The trial court jury held that the
lots were worth $900 less after the cutting. See id. The damages were tripled to
$2,700 pursuant to MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §692.451, which is no longer valid
law. Id. at 294-95. The Supreme Court of Michigan found no error in the jury's
determination of the damage and affirmed the holding. Id at 297.
59. Kratze v. Independent Order of Oddfellows, 500 N.W.2d 115 (Mich. 1993).
Plaintiff purchased land adjacent to land owned by defendant knowing defendant's
structure encroached. Id. at 118. Plaintiff wanted to build apartment buildings on
the property but was denied title insurance because of the encroachment. Id. The
trial court ordered the removal of the encroachment as well as $797, 215.46 in
damages. Id The court of appeals affirmed. Id. The supreme court balanced the
hardships and actions of both parties and held that the court of appeals should not
have used the diminution in value to determine damages or cost of repairs. See id
at 122-23. Because the trespass is permanent, the correct measure of damages is
the diminution in value of the property itself, found by subtracting the value of the
property with the encroachment from the value of the property without it. Id at
123. The supreme court reversed the order of removal of the encroachment and
remanded the case to revalue the damages as that of the 1.2 foot strip of land
encroached upon by the building. Id at 122-23.
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fair market value, which will not capture the special value of the land
to the property owner.
Michigan also has specific remedies depending on the type of
trespass. Michigan Compiled Law Annotated §600.2919 lays out
provisions for a landowner who sustains damage to land and waste.60
Of particular interest for this article, M.C.L.A. §600.2919-(3)(a)
holds: "[t]he circuit court shall grant injunctions to stay and prevent
threatened trespass when the remedies provided by subsection (1),
above, are not fully adequate and in any case where the trespass is of
a continuing nature." 61
This statutory provision should provide for removal of a continuing
trespass by pollution regardless of the cost of removal.
G. North Dakota
In its consideration of granting a mandatory injunction, North
Dakota courts hold "[w]here preventive relief is not adequate to the
situation a mandatory injunction for the performance of some act to
restore the status quo may lie." 62 The court adheres to the American
Jurisprudence on Injunctions, which holds:
[I]t is now well settled that unless prohibited from so doing
by some constitutional or statutory provision, a court of
equity can, and in a proper case will, award mandatory as
well as prohibitive injunctive relief It may, by its mandate,
compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally
60. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §600.2919 (West 2000).
61. Id. Subsection (1) requires treble damages for the removal or injury to trees,
stone, or grass without permission. If the removal or injury is done by a defendant
who thought the land was his own or is used to repair a public road or bridge,
defendant is only liable for single damages.
62. Viestenz v. Arthur Tp., 54 N.W.2d 572, 574 (N.D. 1952). Defendants,
constructing public highways adjacent to plaintiffs property, built embankments
that caused flooding on plaintiffs land. Id. at 573. The supreme court held that the
board of supervisors failed to consider the effect on the natural flow of water in
violation of NDRC 1943, which gave the board authority to build roads, highways,
and bridges. See id at 575-78. The court further held that plaintiff suffered
irreparable harm, had no adequate remedy at law, and was entitled to mandatory
injunction. Id. at 580. The court noted that citizens must show special injury to be
granted injunctive relief Id. at 574.
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done, as well as it may, by its prohibitive powers, restrain
the doing of illegal acts. 63
North Dakota courts are strong proponents for the balancing of
equities in cases involving trespass. While the courts do hold that
"[a] mandatory injunction is a proper remedy to invoke against an
adjoining landowner to compel him to remove an encroachment,"
they also take into consideration the weight the ruling will have on
the defendant.64 In doing so, the courts consider the intent, or lack
thereof, of the defendant. If the trespass is the result of an innocent
mistake, the court is less likely to grant an injunction.65 However,
North Dakota courts are unique in that they do not strictly limit a
plaintiff to a remedy at law when it is available, holding "[tihe fact
that the plaintiff may have a remedy at law by an action for damages
does not prevent equity from assuming jurisdiction if the equitable
remedy is better adapted to render more perfect and complete justice
than the remedy at law." 66
H. Virginia
Virginia courts hold injunctions to be extraordinary remedies and
rely on the discretion of the deciding court to consider "the nature
and circumstances of a particular case." 67  In doing so, the court
63. Id. at 574.
64. Graven v. Backus, 163 N.W.2d 320, 322 (N.D. 1968). Defendant built an
encroaching wall that extended three inches onto the plaintiffs property for the
length of 49.35 feet. Id. at 324. The valuation of the land was around $9, while the
cost to remove the wall was $5,300. Id. at 326. The court was not willing to extend
a mandatory injunction because the encroachment resulted from an innocent
mistake. Id.
65. Id. at 326.
66. Id. at 322.
67. Levisa Coal Co. v. Consol. Coal Co., 662 S.E.2d 44, 53 (Va. 2008). The
owner of a solid mineral estate subject to a long-term mining lease sought
injunction against a third party coal company to prevent it from using the mine
which had been used as a wastewater storage pit. Id. at 45. The circuit court read
the lease contract and determined that defendant had the right to store its excess
water in the mine. Id. at 49. The Supreme Court of Virginia reread the contract and
determined defendant did not have the right, finding that plaintiff had proper
standing to seek injunctive relief, and reversing the circuit court. Id. at 52. The
case was remanded for further consideration of plaintiff s injuries and possible lack
of remedy at law. Id. See also Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, 522 (Va. 2007).
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considers the nature of the trespass, the loss that would be sustained
by each party in granting the injunction, and the affect on the public
at large.6 8 When considering the nature of the trespass, the court is
much more likely to grant an injunction to eliminate a continuing
trespass. The burden of proof to grant an injunction for a continuing
trespass is lower compared to an individual trespass. The courts
provide that "a continuing trespass may be enjoined even though each
individual act of trespass is in itself trivial, or the damage is trifling,
nominal or insubstantial, and despite the fact that no single trespass
causes irreparable injury." 69  This could be particularly useful
depending on the classification of a trespass involving pollution.
When balancing the equities between the parties, the court holds
that if "the loss entailed upon [the trespasser] would be excessively
out of proportion to the injury suffered by [the owner], or a serious
detriment to the public, a court of equity might very properly . . .
deny the injunction, and leave the parties to settle their differences in
a court of law.,,70 However, there are two specific instances in which
In Fancher, parties owned adjoining townhouses. Id at 520. Plaintiffs property
was lower in elevation, protected by a masonry retaining wall to support the grade
separation. Id. Plaintiff brought suit for a sweet gum tree on defendant's property
that allegedly created a noxious nuisance, damaged the retaining wall with its roots,
and caused blockage of plaintiffs sewer pipes. Id. The tree also grew over
plaintiff's roof and deposited leaves and debris on his roof. Id. After a lengthy
discussion of several different state tests for nuisance created by vegetation, the
Supreme Court of Virginia revised the Virginia test and held that encroaching trees
and plants are not nuisances just because they cause shade, drop leaves, flowers, or
fruit, or just because they encroach adjoining property above or below ground, but
may be if they cause actual harm or possess the danger of actual harm. Id. at 522.
The case was remanded for further consideration of possible injunctive relief using
this new standard. Id. at 523.
68. Levisa, 662 S.E.2d at 53.
69. Boerner v. McCallister, 89 S.E.2d 23, 25 (Va. 1955). Plaintiff alleged that
defendant continuously trespassed upon his land to fish in a river that ran through
it. Id at 24. The court recognized that the multiplicity of individual trespasses
invoked a special area of equity law. Id. at 25. The circuit court granted a
permanent injunction. Id The supreme court of appeals affirmed the ruling. Id at
28.
70. Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co., 105 S.E. 117, 122 (Va. 1920).
Plaintiff owned a tract of land adjacent to defendant who had a mining contract. Id.
at 117. The contract held the company could mine all coal from the land, at which
point the land reverted back to plaintiff. Id. After mining one part of the tract,
defendant built a haulway tunnel against which plaintiff protested. Id. at 118.
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the plaintiff will be entitled to an injunction. First, "[u]nless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the property it seeks to protect has
some personal value of sentiment or other intangible quality that
cannot be restored to him at law" then an injunction will not be
proper.7 1 Second, if the plaintiff can show that "monetary damages
would otherwise not make him whole" an injunction will be proper.72
In either case, the court "will give due weight to the adverse effect of
the injunction being granted on the defendant."73 Ultimately, in
Virginia, a plaintiff who wants an injunction will best be served by
submitting evidence of intangible value of a property to convince the
court that their remedy at law simply will not suffice.
L Washington
Washington courts place the burden on the trespasser to prove their
actions meet a series of elements in order to avoid an injunction. If
the elements cannot be met, the court is willing to grant an injunction.
When considering encroaching structures, the court has held that a
mandatory injunction:
[C]an be withheld as oppressive when ... it appears that:
(1) The encroacher did not simply take a calculated risk, act
i[n] bad faith, or negligently, willfully or indifferently
locate the encroaching structure; (2) the damage to the
landowner was slight and the benefit of removal equally
small; (3) there was ample remaining room for a structure
Plaintiff brought suit for injunctive relief and was denied by the initial decree. Id at
117. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held the use of the tunnel created
an unlawful burden upon plaintiff and granted an injunction restraining defendant
from using the tunnel for any purposes other than mining that specific tract. See
122-23.
71. Levisa, 662 S.E.2d at 54; see also Langford v. Taylor, 39 S.E. 223 (Va.
1901). In Langford, the court compelled specific performance of a contract to sell
12 barrels of whisky. Id. at 224. The plaintiff paid in full and the defendants did
not deliver the goods. Id. The court was not willing to require specific performance
because the plaintiff still had a remedy available at law. Id.
72. See Moore v. Steelman, 80 Va. 331 (1885). Partners disputed the ownership
of a large amount of wood. See id. at 332-34. The court denied the injunction
because the plaintiff was unable to prove that monetary damages would not make
him whole. See id. at 339-40.
73. Levisa, 662 S.E.2d at 54.
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suitable for the area and no real limitation on the property's
future use; (4) it is impractical to move the structure as
built; and (5) there is an enormous disparity in resulting
hardships.74
These elements could be helpful in a case involving trespass by
pollution, notably element one that requires that the defendant did not
act negligently, willfully, or indifferently. In the event that a polluter
acts negligently, for example by failing to maintain underground
tanks, a landowner will have the right to a mandatory injunction.
The court elaborates on this burden, holding "in that the relief
granted by the denial of the injunction affected by the owner's
possessory rights ... and is exceptional relief for the exceptional
case, we ... require ... that the evidence of the elements listed above
be clearly and convincingly proven by the encroacher." 75 This clear
establishment of a burden on the encroacher should and would likely
extend to cases of trespass involving pollution.
IV. STATES DENYING INJUNCTION TO REMOVE TRESPASS
Some states do not accept the proposition that trespass claims are
entitled to more comprehensive injunctive relief than nuisance
claims. Most of these states, as the following discussion
demonstrates, merely rely on the concept that the cost of the remedy
cannot be greater than the value of the damage done. However, in
those states, it may still be possible that a plaintiff who owns property
with a special significance and value, not readily quantified by
traditional appraisal methods, can obtain injunctive relief to remove
the trespass. In such a case, the court would have to find that the
74. Arnold v. Melani, 449 P.2d 800, 802-06 (Wash. 1968). Defendants had
built an encroaching house, while plaintiffs had built an encroaching fence. Id. at
802. The fence extended 8.4 feet onto the land of the defendants. Id. The home
extended 3.28 feet over the property line on to the plaintiffs' lot. Id. Both parties
did surveys of the property boundaries. Id. The trial court accepted the survey done
by defendant's surveyor, but denied defendant's request for mandatory injunction,
instead granting an easement to plaintiff because the cost of removal would far
exceed the total value of defendant's property. Id. The Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed the holding but limited the easement to the area covered by
the encroachments. Id. at 806.
75. Id. at 806.
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special value of the property warranted a remedy that restored the
property to its original condition even though the cost of such a
remedy exceeds the appraised value of the property. In addition, the
plaintiff in such states could focus on the remedy by seeking a
mandatory injunction without regard to the cost of injunction in an
attempt to avoid the issue of comparative costs. The use of experts to
testify about the special significance of the property may help deflect
the court from a focus on mere economic costs by focusing on values
other than economic costs or by converting the intangible costs into
substantial economic costs, an approach increasingly used for a more
balanced "cost-benefit" analysis of state and federal regulations.
A. Ohio
Ohio courts are very cautious about granting injunctions. Courts
have held that "[t]he right to an injunction must be clear and the
proof thereof clear and convincing, and the right established by the
strength of plaintiffs' own case rather than by any weakness of that of
his adversary."7 6 The state considers this benchmark fixed and has
not shown itself liable to waiver under varying circumstances.
The state has encountered sentimental value arguments in trespass
cases and rejected them outright.7 In both White and Oberhaus, the
court ruled that "an injunction will not be granted where damage is
trifling, fanciful, sentimental or a mere inconvenience, and that the
76. See White v. Long, 231 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967). Plaintiff sought
to enjoin the continued operation of a sewage disposal plant that was discharging
fluid upstream from plaintiffs property. Id. at 338. Plaintiff alleged that the stream
turned "grayish or milky in color; that there was an odor about it objectionable to
them ... they found dead crawfish" and their livestock would not drink the water.
Id. at 339. The court ruled in favor of defendants, holding plaintiff failed to sustain
its burden of proof. Id. The court further explained that it must take exceptional
care when granting injunctions that would suspend the operation of an important
public work. Id
77. See id.; see also Oberhaus v. Alexander, 274 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio Ct. App.
1971). In Oberhaus, plaintiff sought to enjoin further development of a
neighboring county airport and to receive damages for the loss of value to their
property. Id. at 771. Plaintiffs argued that while the airport was not finished and
open yet, the finished airport would create a danger to them. Id at 772. The court
held that "although a continuing trespass is a basis for injunctive relief, it is not
sufficient to have merely a speculative, anticipated trespass." Id. The court ruled
that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof to show a right to "the
extraordinary remedy of injunction" and held for defendant. Id.
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invasion of a private right without actual and palpable injury does not
stir the conscience of the court so that injunction will lie."" The
court equates sentimental value with trifle and fancy, giving it
negligible monetary value.
B. New York
New York courts have long held in cases of trespass that "when the
reasonable cost of repairing the injury, or the cost of restoring the
land to its former condition is less than the diminution in the market
value of the whole property by reason of the injury, the costs of
restoration is the proper measure of damages. . .but when the cost of
restoring is more than such diminution, the latter is usually the true
measure of damages." 79 In such cases, the court requires a plaintiff to
show only one valuation of damages, then shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove the other if he wishes to refute the purported
value.80
In addition to the state's adherence to the "lower of the two costs"
damage reward, New York Jurisprudence §86 specifically rejects the
use of sentimental value when determining the value or loss of value
in a damaged property, stating:
Although the damages recoverable for the loss of personal
property having no market value is sometimes measured by
78. Oberhaus, 274 N.E.2d at 772 (quoting White, 231 N.E.2d at 340).
79. See Hartshorn v. Chaddock, 31 N.E. 997 (N.Y. 1892). Plaintiff sued for
damages done to his property by a diverted stream. Id. at 997. Plaintiff offered
evidence to prove the cost of restoring the land. Id. at 998. Neither party presented
evidence regarding the diminution in value of the property. Id. The court ruled that
because defendant did not bring such evidence, he waived the right to the argument
and must pay the cost of restoration. Id. at 999.
80. See Jenkins v. Etlinger, 432 N.E.2d 589 (N.Y. 1982). Plaintiffs brought suit
to recover costs for removing silt from a pond that sat between adjoining
properties. Id. at 590. Defendant purchased landfill for part of a landscaping
project, some of which flowed into the pond, discoloring the water and preventing
its use for a summer. Id. Plaintiffs offered evidence of the cost of removal of the
landfill from the pond. Id. Defendants argued that plaintiff offered no evidence of
the diminution in value of the property. Id. The court ruled that after a plaintiff
shows one valuation of damages, "the burden falls upon the defendant to prove that
a lesser amount than that claimed by plaintiff will sufficiently compensate for the
loss." Id. at 591. Because plaintiffs met their burden, the award for removal costs
was upheld. Id.
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the value of the property to its owner, merely sentimental
or fanciful values which the owner himself or herself
attaches to the property should not be considered. The jury
may properly consider the probability, practicability, or
difficulty of replacement, as well as the cost of the article,
but not its sentimental value to the owner. Thus, recovery
has been denied for damage to photographs having a purely
sentimental value to the owner. However, where sentiment
is shared by others, so that it affects the value of the
property, sentiment is compensated.
Such guidelines, make it unlikely New York courts would grant
remediation costs in excess of the value of the property.
C. Kentucky
Kentucky courts also limit recovery to the lesser of two values
between diminution in value and restoration costs. 82 The Supreme
Court of Kentucky has held that "a plaintiff seeking restoration cost
damages in an injury-to-property case need not introduce evidence of
a diminution in the fair market value of the property case in order to
state a prima facie case." 83 The court relies on the classification of
the injury, be it permanent or temporary, holding that if "the cost to
restore the property to substantially its original state exceeds the
amount by which the injury decreased the property's value" it will be
deemed a permanent injury and the proper damage value will be the
diminution in value, but "if the injury to the property is temporary,
the cost to return it to its original state" is the proper measure.84 The
court limits itself in granting restoration costs, holding that
"[r]easonable restoration costs are an available remedy only in
'temporary' injury cases where the property may be restored to its
81. 36 N.Y. JUR. 2D Damages §86 (2009).
82. See Ellison v. R & B Contracting, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 66 (Ky. 2000).
Defendant, R & B Contracting, Inc., was doing subcontractor work for Lawrence
Construction and Leasing Inc. on a project to reconstruct Kentucky Highway 17,
including excavation work and disposal of waste materials. Id. at 68. Plaintiffs
owned property facing the highway. Id. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that R & B
Contracting trespassed by storing heavy equipment and depositing debris on
plaintiffs' property without consent. Id.
83. Id. at 74.
84. Id at 69.
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original state at a cost less than the amount by which the market
value of the property decreased as a result of the trespass."85 In doing
so, the court rules out restoration costs for permanent injuries as a
result of trespass. Finally, the court outright rejects any grant of
restoration costs that exceed the diminution in value, let alone the
value of the property overall, holding "in no case, of course, may the
amount of recovery exceed the diminution in market value"
elaborating that "if the costs of restoration exceed the diminution in
value they are presumptively unreasonable." 86
Kentucky courts have rejected consideration of sentimental value
when determining damages. The court has held that "[p]urely
sentimental matters have no place in an inquiry of this sort" and that
"the only standard of legal compensation is the diminution in the fair
market value of the property."87
D. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania is more explicit in its explanation of damages the
court will grant in a trespass case. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania holds that in trespass cases, "the measure of damages is
the cost of remedying the injury, unless such cost exceeds the value
of the property injured, in which case the value of the property
85. Id. at 70.
86. Burkshire Terrace, Inc. v. Schroerlucke, 467 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Ky. 1971).
Plaintiffs brought suit against a subdivision for damages allegedly resulting from
water flowing from the subdivision. Id. at 771. Plaintiffs based their claim on the
subdivision's changing of the natural flow of the water. See id The court
determined the fair diminution in value to be $16,000. Id at 772. Plaintiffs said
they could fix the land for $12,000, $12,000 was awarded. Id.
87. See City of Lexington v. Chenault, 152 S.W. 939, 941 (Ky. 1913). Plaintiff
brought suit after the city lowered the grade of a street bordering her property,
causing a retaining wall to collapse. Id. Plaintiff had three witnesses, over
defendant's objections, testify how much they thought the property had been
damaged without mention of fair market value before or after the event. Id. The
court of appeals (then the highest court in the state) ruled that this was in error and
reversed plaintiffs reward of $1,500. Id. See also Morgan v. Hightower, 163
S.W.2d 21, 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1942) in which plaintiff sued for damages after a man
came into his house and committed suicide. Plaintiff alleged the event resulted in a
diminution in value of his property because his home was "shunned by the public
and its good name and fame ha[d] been destroyed." Id. The court held that "such
an inquiry is more imaginary than real, or at most is but sentimental and is not a
proper element of damage." Id.
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becomes the measure of damages."88 With such limiting holdings,
Pennsylvania has definitively ruled against the possibility of recovery
of any damages beyond the value of the property itself.
V. LITIGATION STRATEGY
One central feature of most of these adverse rulings is that plaintiff
was seeking damages for past injury, to be measured by the cost of
restoration. It is not certain the courts would reach the same result if
the case involved the continued presence on the property of the
trespassing material and plaintiff sought removal of the trespassing
material from the property by way of a mandatory injunction and did
not seek any monetary compensation as a result of the continued
presence of trespassing material on the property. If the plaintiff
frames one of the claim solely in terms of injunctive relief, where the
cost of removal is far greater than the value of the land, and where
the courts reject the proposition that a private landowner can be
compelled to allow another private party to use her land for disposal
of waste, it may force the defendant to consider reaching a settlement
in which it pays plaintiff considerably more than the value of the land
in order to continue to be allowed to have the trespassing material
remain on the plaintiffs property. In such a case the plaintiff will
probably want to insist that a condition of the settlement be that
defendant take steps to prevent new trespassing.
88. See Welliver v. Pennsylvania Canal Co., 23 Pa. Super. 79 (1903).
Defendant operated a canal adjacent to plaintiff's property. Id. A break in the canal
led to seepage onto plaintiffs property. Id. One issue was whether it was
plaintiffs duty to take steps to prevent the seepage from further damaging her
property. The court ruled that plaintiff need only exercise ordinary and prudent
care in preventing continued injury. Id. The court opined that "it was not
[plaintiff's] duty to construct a ditch which would cost more than the value of her
land, because, as already intimated, she could recover no more than the value of her
land in any event and was not bound to expend more in preventing the injury than
she could recover from the defendant." Id. at 4; see also Herron v. Jones &
Laughlin Co., Ltd., 23 Pa.Super. 226, (1903). Plaintiff sued for damage to his
property allegedly caused by defendant's furnace. Welliver, 23 Pa. Super. at 4.
Defendant used the furnace for ore blasting during the winter, leading to ore being
thrown against plaintiff's house and lot. Id. When determining the diminution in
value, the court recognized that "the measure of damage ... is the cost of
restoration ... unless such cost should equal or exceed the value of the property, in
which case the value is the correct measure of damages." Id
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One note of caution is warranted. Toxic pollution cases are
inherently expensive, both in terms of time and economic resources.
Careful screening of these cases is essential before claims are filed.
As the previous discussion demonstrates, some states are much
friendlier to the ideas advanced in this article than other states. If the
case being considered is weak on some of the underlying issues - if
identifying the source of the trespass will be difficult or there is an
issue of some culpability of the plaintiffs in the problem (for instance
groundwater pollution from TCE contamination where plaintiffs may
have used TCE in their septic systems) - it may be prudent to not
pursue the case, particularly if the state is also one where the law on
trespass is considerably less favorable. From a factual perspective,
the ideal case is one with the following elements:
1. there is no question about the source of the pollution;
2. the pollution is at a substantial level and, even though it
may not be creating a health risk, it is substantially
more than background levels;
3. the law is clear that the portion of the property that is
contaminated is owned by the plaintiff - e.g. in western
states groundwater is usually owned by the state and
groundwater pollution is not considered a trespass on
the property of the plaintiff;
4. the property is the plaintiffs residence and the plaintiff
owned the property prior to the time the pollution
entered the property;
5. the jurisdiction is one like Massachusetts that has a long
history of acknowledging that property ownership
includes the right to exclusive occupation of the
property;
6. defendant is a private company engaged in a purely
commercial endeavor and not a governmental or quasi-
governmental entity engaged in some activity that is
allegedly serving the general public (salt pollution from
a storage area for road salt owned by the local
government for public roadways would be a more
difficult fact situation than a private company storing
salt on its land for its own use);
7. finally, if the law is uncertain or even unfavorable,
resist the temptation to press the legal theories
2010] 189
190 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [
discussed here, where there is a weak fact pattern
because, as the old adage goes, "bad facts make bad
law" and focus on recovering damages under traditional
nuisance law principles.
CONCLUSION
Where pollution has come onto plaintiffs property, the defendant
should not be allowed to leave it on plaintiffs property merely
because removal would be very expensive. Any other result would
effectively allow a property owner to be compelled to allow the
property to be used for a purpose not authorized by the owner.
The remedy of a full removal of the trespassing material from the
plaintiffs property, if pressed effectively, can have a substantial
impact on the decision-making process of companies whose activities
are capable of causing trespasses. In the calculations that form the
basis for business decisions - i.e. determine cost and sell at a price
that recovers that cost plus a profit - externalities like pollution are
often ignored because they are not immediate costs of the company, it
is uncertain if they will ever become costs because not all pollution
results in litigation, and often the costs of such a litigation are easy to
predict and can be easily absorbed or covered by insurance. Thus, for
example, a company that operates a combustion source from which
particles are released and fall on adjacent land may not be inclined to
order expensive pollution control equipment to eliminate all particle
releases if the cost of addressing the pollution problem in subsequent
litigation will be no more than the lost value of the adjacent land. In
addition, those pollution damage costs will occur in the future or may
not occur at all, and are likely to be substantially less than the cost of
the pollution control equipment. However, if the cost that must be
considered is difficult to calculate, but potentially substantial because
it will require removal of all the pollution from the adjacent land, the
company will have to consider that fact in deciding whether to buy
the expensive pollution control equipment.
Another benefit of the total removal remedy in a trespass case is
that the remedy, regardless of its cost, is of a type that most
businesses abhor. If the remedy of an injunction against the
defendant is granted, it will force the defendant, often under the
supervision or oversight of the court, to actually conduct the removal.
This forces the defendant to get into the pollution removal business
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and to do it with the plaintiff and the court looking over its shoulder.
Most companies find that being forced into a business they do not
wish to be in and to do so with close supervision from "outsiders" is
intolerable, and will go to great lengths to avoid such a situation.
Thus, like all environmental pollution litigation, a case for total
removal of trespassing pollution helps to internalize an external cost.
It has the added benefit of making the magnitude of that cost to the
polluter less easy to calculate and the implementation of the remedy a
task the polluter will find abhorrent. Because in the business world
uncertainty of cost is much feared and outside supervision of business
activities is even more feared, the uncertain costs of a total removal
remedy, with its court and plaintiff supervision features, can help to
encourage prevention, which is always preferable to even the most
successful litigation. The existence of this remedy may also cause
insurance companies to substantially increase rates to businesses
whose activities have the potential for off-site pollution and who are
seeking liability coverage. If all insurance companies were to police
pollution-producing activities of potential insureds seeking general
liability and pollution insurance coverage the way they have policed
fire-causing activities of insureds seeking fire insurance, there would
be a substantial reduction in the number of pollution events and the
number of pollution law suits. Until that day, trespass by pollution,
will remain a potent cause of action for those impacted by the
pollution and hopefully, a mandatory injunction to remove the
pollution from the plaintiffs property will become a substantial
inducement to avoid all off-site pollution that can result in a trespass.
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